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Abstract 
The vast growth of the payment card industry (PCI) in the last 50 years has placed the 
industry in the centre of attention, not only because of this growth, but also because of 
the increase of fraudulent transactions. The conducted research in this domain has 
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produced statistical reports on detection of fraud, and ways of protection.  On the other 
hand, the relevant body of research is quite partial and covers only specific topics. For 
instance, the provided reports related to losses due to fraudulent usage of cards usually 
do not present the measures taken to combat fraud nor do they explain the way fraud 
happens. This can turn out to be confusing and makes one believe that card usage can 
be more negative than positive.  
This paper is intended to provide accumulative and organized information of the efforts 
made to protect businesses from fraud. We try to reveal the effectiveness and efficiency 
of the current fraud combating techniques and show that organized worldwide efforts are 
needed to take care of the larger part of the problem. The research questions that will be 
addressed in the paper are: 1) how can IT/IS help in combating fraud in the PCI?, and 2) 
is the implemented IT/IS effective and efficient enough to bring progress in combating 
fraud? 
Our research methodology is based on a case study conducted in a Macedonian bank. 
The research is explorative and will be mostly qualitative in nature; however some 
quantitative aspects will be included.  
The findings indicate that fraud can take up many forms. A classification of the different 
forms of data theft into different fraudulent appearances was made. We showed that the 
benefits from implementing the fraud reduction efforts are multiple. Results show that a 
bank has to be very small to experience losses from fixed expenditures coming from the 
implementation of the fraud reduction IT/IS.  Medium-sized and large banks should not 
even see any problems arising from those expenditures. Based on the empirical data 
and the presented facts we can conclude that the fraud reduction IT/IS do have a 
positive effect on all sides of the payment process and fulfills the expectations of all 
stakeholders.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the introduction of the plastic pay card in 1946 by John Biggins, a banker in 
Brooklyn, the use of cards have steadily grown to large numbers. According to the U.S. 
Census Bureau there were 159 million credit cardholders in the U.S. in 2000, 173 million 
in 2006 and that number is projected to grow to 181 million by 2010. (US Census 
Bureau, 2009). That success leaded to the formation of bank card associations like 
Mastercard Amex and Visa. Today bank card associations are large international 
corporations offering standardized services throughout the world. The vast growth of the 
payment card industry (PCI) in the last 50 years has placed the industry in the centre of 
attention, not only because of this growth, but also because of the increase of fraudulent 
transactions. The European Commission reports estimated credit card fraud in European 
Union is between €500 en €1000 million (APACS, 2008; FPEG, 2009; European 
Commission, 2008).   
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The conducted research in the domain of credit card fraud reduction has produced 
statistical reports on detection of fraud, and ways of protection. On the other hand, the 
relevant body of research is quite partial and covers only specific topics. For instance, 
the provided reports related to losses due to fraudulent usage of cards usually do not 
present the measures taken to combat fraud nor do they explain the way fraud happens. 
Many different efforts of combating fraud are mostly individual efforts of banks or other 
organizations directly connected to end customers. This can turn out to be confusing and 
makes one believe that card usage can be more negative than positive. The motivation 
behind this research is to shed some light to the worldwide spread fraud problem in the 
PCI. The PCI gathers payment organizations, as well as banks, merchants and 
cardholders. Other organizations involved are plastic card manufacturers, terminal and 
ATM vendors, certification organizations and software providers. So the number of 
stakeholders that are benefitting from the popularity of the PCI is large. It is therefore  
paramount that a deep understanding of the overall pay card fraud mechanisms and the 
IT/IS that can be helpful in combating the fraud,  is established.     
This paper is intended to provide accumulative and organized information of the efforts 
made to protect businesses from fraud. We try to reveal the effectiveness and efficiency 
of the current fraud combating techniques and show that organized worldwide efforts are 
needed to take care of the larger part of the problem. The research questions that will be 
addressed in the paper are: 1) how can IT/IS help in combating fraud in the PCI?, and 2) 
is the implemented IT/IS effective and efficient enough to bring progress in combating 
fraud? 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in the next paragraph we bring an 
overview of the existing literature on the fraud problem in the PCI, the associated 
vulnerabilities and the fraud reduction efforts. Paragraph three reveal our research 
methodology. based on a case study conducted in a Macedonian bank. In paragraph 
four we show the effects of the fraud reduction efforts. A discussion of the findings is 
brought in paragraph five and finally in paragraph six we make some conclusions.  
 
OVERVIEW OF THE FRAUD PROBLEM IN THE PCI 
The Payment Card System (PCS)  
The payment card system stores and transfers data among different stakeholders. The 
whole process is quite simple and involves five parties, the retailer or ATM, the acquiring 
bank that installed the POS terminal at the retailer’s or that installed the ATM, the 
payment organization like MasterCard, Visa, Amex or other, the issuing bank that issued 
the card and the cardholder initiating the payment (APACS, 2006). The process is 
shown in figure 1. The cardholder initiates the payment by visiting the merchant location 
or the ATM with the intention to pay for goods or services or to withdraw cash from the 
ATM. The cardholders card is swiped on the terminal to obtain the account data. The 
amount is then entered in the terminal by the merchant or by the cardholder, when cash 
is withdrawn from the ATM (arrow 1 in figure 1). Data is transferred through the acquiring 
bank and the payment organization to the issuing bank for verification (arrow 2). The 
issuing bank verifies or declines the account data as well as the amount requested for 
payment since the issuing bank keeps constant record of the account balance (arrow 3 
and arrow 4). The response is sent back through the payment organization and the 
acquiring bank to the POS terminal or ATM in form of a response for approval or denial 
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of the transaction. In case of an approval, the funds are debited from the cardholder’s 
account immediately (arrow 5) and transferred later on by the issuing bank to the 
acquiring bank that transfers the funds to the merchant’s account or the ATM’s account 
to balance the same. 
Payment Organisation
Card Issuer Acquirer
Card Holder Merchant
1. Card presented for payment
2. Transaction
data
3. Transaction
data
2. Transaction
data
4. Transaction
Data (via card or
bank statement)
5. debet to 
account
€
€
€
 
Figure 1 The card transaction process (source: APACS) 
 
All of the parties involved in the PCS keep track of the account data, cardholder data 
and transaction data for further reference and for the actual fund transfer between the 
banks. This data is vulnerable and if stolen the data can be used to conduct fraudulent 
transactions or to produce fake cards.  
 
Vulnerabilities of the Payment Card System  
There are many types of fraudulent behaviors, however the terminology can be quite 
different depending on the organization that classifies the types of fraud. Fraud has also 
been changed trough time and new types of fraud have occurred. There is no worldwide 
accepted official classification. Bank card associations use their own classifications 
which are for internal use only (Visa, 2009; MasterCard, 2009).  
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The UK Payment Association recognizes five types of fraud: 1) lost/stolen credit card 
where the card is lost or stolen and then attempted to be used by an unauthorized 
individual, 2) mail non receipt where the card or cards are being intercepted while being 
sent to the cardholders by post, 3) counterfeit which is the type of fraud same as 
skimming, where the card information is copied from the magnetic stripe, 4) card not 
present where the account information from the card is used to make unauthorized 
purchases over the telephone or the internet, and 5) card ID theft where the account 
information is stolen by unauthorized individuals to make fraudulent purchases and can 
take many different forms. (APACS, 2007).  
Another classification comes from Barclaycard, an issuer of at least 12 different types of 
card products. Barclaycard classifies card fraud in the following categories: 1) counterfeit 
fraud (skimming), 2) theft or loss of cards, 3) postal interceptions, 4) use of card details, 
5) identity fraud, and 6) cash point fraud. The explanation behind the different types of 
fraud is similar to the previous one, but there are some differences. Counterfeit fraud 
includes stealing of the credit card data and its usage for production of a clone card. 
Theft or loss of card includes usage of the original card, stolen or lost one at an 
acceptance location. Postal interception includes theft of the original card by its 
interception when posted to the original cardholder’s address. Card detail use includes 
usage of card data from official card payment documents, like sales slips and card 
statements, for fraudulent card fund access. Identity fraud includes usage of personal 
and other information from official banking documents for fraudulent fund access and it 
does not only include card fraud. Cash point fraud includes card theft and PIN 
information at cash points for fraudulent usage after the theft and includes techniques for 
cardholder deception for card and PIN theft. (Barclaycard, 2009).  
If we compare this classification with the previous one, we can see that there are no 
major differences. The main types of fraudulent behaviour are quite the same. The 
differences occur in the terminology and in the cross-relation of the explanations. Some 
types of fraudulent behaviour, like counterfeit fraud or skimming and cash point fraud 
both include theft of card information, but in different ways. Another difference is the 
introduction of cash point fraud, a type of fraud that does not occur in the official 
classification from APACS. Cash point fraud, on the other hand, describes just another 
way to steal card and PIN information, apart from the way described in counterfeit fraud.  
Some organizations include also phishing as a type of credit card fraud. Phishing can be 
seen as theft of vital personal data (Woolsey, 2008). 
Since pay card fraud is heavily related to data theft and usage of those data for 
fraudulent purchases, we can use that fact to try to classify the different fraud types and 
produce a more organized classification of the different fraud types. We start from the 
payment system using data to identify and confirm the identity of the cardholder for 
transaction approval and uses cards to transfer them through the system to identify and 
confirm the transaction of the cardholder. We can see that there are three sources for 
data theft, the media used for authentication, the system that transfers data, and the 
cardholder. Therefore, we could classify the fraud types according to the target of data 
theft: 1) theft of original card and cardholder information directly from the card, 2) theft of 
original card and cardholder information directly from the system, and 3) theft of original 
card and cardholder information directly from the cardholder. 
In practice, data theft from the card directly can occur in three ways: data could be stolen 
by stealing the card, data could be stolen by recording the cards embossing without the 
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cardholder’s knowledge and data could be stolen by reading the data from the card 
without the cardholder’s knowledge. Therefore, it would seem more practical to split the 
first fraud type into theft of original card and cardholder information directly from the card 
by card theft, theft of original card and cardholder information directly from the card by 
recording the cards embossing and theft of original card and cardholder information 
directly from the card by card copying 
If we take into account what we have previously described, we could classify the 
different, most common ways to commit crime in the payment card system into: 1) 
counterfeiting  or skimming, 2) theft or loss of cards, 3) card ID theft, 4) identity theft, and 
5) cyber crime. In table 1 we present an overview of the fraud types.  
 
 
Fraud type What How 
Counterfeiting theft of original card and cardholder 
information directly from the card 
ATM, POS or device skimming 
Theft or loss 
of cards 
theft or loss of original cards and PINs Card loss, card theft, card 
trapping, mail non receipt 
Card ID theft theft of original card and cardholder 
information directly from the card’s 
embossing 
Card loss, card theft, card 
trapping, mail non receipt 
Identity theft theft of card, PIN and other information 
directly from the cardholder 
Phishing, social engineering 
Cyber crime theft of card, PIN and information directly from 
the system 
Hacking 
Table 1 – Classification of pay card fraud types 
 
Damage from different fraud types 
Losses generated by plastic card fraud vary between different countries and regions, 
depending on many circumstances, among which is card usage. The tendency towards 
bigger fraud losses would naturally be higher in regions or countries that tend to use 
plastic cards more. Those countries or regions, on the other hand, could provide a 
clearer image of the losses that can be generated by plastic card fraud. 
UK, a country with a long card usage history and a very well developed plastic card 
market, has shown that the growth of the fraud losses during one decade, reaching a 
growth of £382.8 million or 313.7% (APACS, 2007). 
 
Fraud type 10 year total losses Average 
loss/year 
Average rise/year 
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Card not present £ 1.000.300.000 £ 100.030.000 47.2 % 
Counterfeit £ 950.100.000 £ 95.010.000 29.8 % 
Lost/Stolen £ 920.200.000 £ 92.020.000 2.6 % 
Mail non receipt £ 294.100.000 £ 29.410.000 13.0 % 
Card ID theft £ 226.400.000 £ 22.640.000 19.9 % 
Table 2 – Plastic Card fraud losses by fraud type on UK-issued cards 1997-2006 (APACS, 2007) 
We can easily notice that counterfeit, card not present and lost/stolen represent the 
highest part of the total losses. Every fraud type, on the other hand, shows a rapid 
increase during the years, except for the lost/stolen fraud type which shows a minor 
increase over the years. 
The damage presented above is always connected to losses of one of the parties 
involved in the transaction process. Depending on the transaction circumstances, the 
cardholder might be reimbursed for the transaction, but then the loss would have to be 
covered by another party, the merchant or one of the two banks involved in the dispute. 
Therefore, determining the motivation behind the protective measures is fairly easy 
when there are so much parties involved. The PCI is a global business offering services 
to individuals throughout the world. Those customers rely on the effectiveness of their 
banks also in the field of security. This pressure from the customers does not end with 
the banks that issue and service their cards, it continues towards the major card 
schemes like MasterCard, Visa, Amex and others that connect the banks to the system 
as their own customers. Since there is more than one customer level, the tendencies 
and actions for securing the payments are different. Banks are trying to protect their end 
customers and the card schemes are trying to protect the banks as their customers. 
 
Fraud reduction efforts  
There are basically two ways of dealing with the fraud types: prevention and detection. 
Prevention is possible for some fraud types where an occurrence can easily be 
predicted. Detection of fraud is done when it is difficult to predict all  of the possible ways 
for the fraud to occur.  
Fraud reductions efforts based on prevention are mostly IT/IS solutions combined with 
organizational measurements. Fraud reduction IT/IS are 3-D secure technology and chip 
card technology. Organisational measurements are based and inspired from PCI 
security standards.  
3-D secure technology is a protocol used as an extra layer of security for online pay card 
transactions. It was originally developed by Visa to improve the security of internet 
payments and offered to customers as the Verified by Visa service (Visa Canada, 2009). 
Services based on the protocol have also been adopted by MasterCard, under the name 
MasterCard SecureCode, and by JCB International as J/Secure. 
Chip card technology includes usage of smart cards for data carrying, otherwise needed 
for transaction completion (EMVCo, 2009). The term smart cards refers to cards that use 
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a chip to carry the data and to carry applications that allow the basic functioning of the 
card along with other services, depending on the offer from the issuer. The term smart 
card is quite broad though. First of all it can refer to cards that are used outside the PCI, 
like the ones used for telephone booths. Secondly it can refer to chip cards that allow or 
do not allow the execution of applications. According to Barge a chip cards can be 
classified into memory cards and microprocessor cards. Memory cards do not have an 
embedded processing logic and do not include applications. They only include certain 
values loaded on to them by the issuer and could include some type of protection logic. 
Microprocessor cards, on the other hand, have embedded processing logic and could 
support usage of applications. These are the real smart cards. They operate on the 
basis of the power supplied by a terminal. The usage also needs a display to operate the 
applications or functions offered by the card. They include a microprocessor, an 
operating system and read/write memory that can be updated many times (Barge, 
2002).  
PCI security standards are an organized effort of the card schemes American Express, 
Discover Financial Services, JCB International, MasterCard Worldwide and Visa Inc. 
The creation of the standards and management of the same is left in the hands of a PCI 
Security Standards Council (PCI Security Standards Council, 2008). 
Detection of fraud is organized in a risk monitoring system, mostly supported by IT/IS. A 
risk monitoring information system (RMIS), in the sense of PCI fraud monitoring is a 
system that monitors the transactions in the payment network. Since it is usually used 
individually by every bank, the system monitors the activity of every card issued by the 
bank and the activity of every terminal, POS or ATM that is installed by the bank. The 
RMIS follows certain rules to extract transactions that have a certain level of probability 
of fraud. This action could probably be done manually, but since the system of a medium 
to large bank authorizes a large amount of transactions in a short period of time, 
software is needed to assess the fraud probability of every transaction and extract those 
that have a high fraud probability. 
The problem of fraud detection can be seen as a filtering problem and is not an easy 
task. System automation is even harder to accomplish. This is because the filter cannot 
give accurate guesses all the time and automation would mean automatic response 
implementation to the system guesses. Ultimately, this would mean that some of the 
authentic transactions would be considered as fraudulent (false positives) and the 
cardholders annoyed with recent checks from the bank that could even block the cards 
without checking with the customer. Another problem is the efficiency in fraud detection 
and the identification of rare fraud cases. There is a technical possibility to produce a 
highly accurate detection system but the costs for such development would be too high 
and the system would become too complex and generate extra costs later on for new 
fraud trends adaptation. Most of the systems are therefore developed to handle large 
amounts of transactions and are oriented towards identification of most fraudulent 
transactions, but not all. In most cases it is acceptable that the system would bypass 
some of the fraudulent attempts. 
However, researchers and software developers are constantly trying to find new ways to 
make the system as accurate as possible, keeping in mind the need for simplification. 
Behind this intention lies the development of Bayesian networks, used for fraud 
detection that are streaming to replace neural networks, used for fraud detection since 
the beginning of the 90’s. A neural network is based on finding patterns in transaction 
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variables that indicate fraud (Maes et al., 2002). The risk score calculation is based on 
simple mathematical functions that evaluate transaction variables and are 
interconnected using weights that give the final risk score. The training, however, is 
based on large amounts of data, clearly marked as fraudulent or non-fraudulent 
transactions, which are used to find patterns and assign weights. A Bayesian network is 
based on transaction features that are highly indicative of fraud and on calculation of the 
probability for fraud. The final score is based on the calculation of the probability 
distribution of all that features individual probability distributions. Because the system is 
based on probability distribution, it requires smaller amounts of data clearly marked as 
fraudulent or non-fraudulent transactions for system training. This reduces the time and 
effort for initial system training and can be used in smaller banks that do not have large 
amounts of data for training purposes. Furthermore, the system is more flexible and 
adaptive to new fraud patterns than the neural network system. Finding fraud patterns 
with neural network systems and assigning weights is an iterative process and requires 
complete system retrain to find new patterns that have never emerged before and to 
assign correct weights. Bayesian network systems, on the other hand, do not require 
complete system retrain. They only require classification of the new transactions as 
fraudulent or non-fraudulent to extract new features and calculate probability. This is why 
they are more efficient and require less time and effort to adapt the system after the 
initial training (Alaric, 2007:1-4). 
There are efforts made to make the neural networks more adaptive as well, based on 
generalization of transaction variables among transactions previously identified as 
fraudulent. This means extraction of similar transaction variables that would be followed 
to calculate the risk score for the transaction. The extraction is done on several levels 
that form buckets of transactions with similar variables. Every bucket carries a certain 
confidence value which is calculated according to the number of transactions that share 
the same variable and the total number of transactions. The confidence can be used to 
calculate the risk score for the transaction. This however, does not make the system 
adaptive later and still requires complete system retrain to include new fraud patterns 
(Brause et al., 2009).  
Bayesian networks are believed to be more precise in fraud detection than neural 
networks because neural networks are based on statistics to extract fraudulent 
transactions, while Bayesian networks are based on probability calculated for every 
feature identified as fraudulent. Having in mind that they require less training time and 
are more adaptive to new fraud trends, we can say that they contribute to most of the 
problems described earlier and are more efficient than neural network based systems 
(Alaric, 2007). 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Our research methodology is based on a case study conducted in a Macedonian bank. 
The research is explorative and will be mostly qualitative in nature; however some 
quantitative aspects will be included (Yin, 2004; Myers, 2009). The purpose of the case 
study is to explore the effects of different fraud reduction efforts implementation that are 
explained in the previous paragraph.   
All fraud reducing efforts require finances for their implementation to return some value 
for the different parties affected by the fraudulent occurrences. Our most important 
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research question still remains: is the implemented IT/IS effective and efficient enough to 
bring progress in combating fraud? 
To bring some light to the question, we are going to explore the investments made for 
the implementation of IT/IS for combating fraud. In doing so, we have to make certain 
assumptions since the pure investments are hard to extract. Almost every investment is 
connected with features that do not refer to combating fraud only. Sometimes we will 
also have to make parallels between IT/IS specific for combating fraud and similar ones 
to bring closer picture to the expenditures.  
We explore the benefits from the implementation of IT/IS for combating fraud, both 
tangible and intangible. Here, we have to make certain assumptions since fraud is very 
hard to predict. We can never say how much fraud losses will be generated in the future 
or how many fraudulent attempts will be made. Experience shows that fraud can move 
from very small to very large amounts within one year solely. We will also try to explore 
the direct fraud reduction effects from the fraud combating IT/IS. 
In the process of exploring the effects of the fraud combating IT/IS, we will use the 
experience of a Macedonian Bank which is a member of the payment card schemes for 
more than five years. In the text the bank is referred as ‘the Bank’. The Bank has 
experienced a vast growth of the payment card business over the years, mostly because 
of the market circumstances and the need for short-term credits, but also because of the 
card business organization in which attention has been paid to fraud awareness.  
In evaluation of the Banks investments in fraud combating IT/IS we have evaluated four 
major systems and technologies: PCI Security Standards (PCI SS) 3-D technology, chip 
technology, and RMIS. 
 
FINDINGS 
The PCI SS in the Bank have been implemented several years ago on a processor level 
and has outsourced its processing operations. The implementation of the PCI SS are a 
concern of the outsourcer. The security standards are quite broad and concern data 
security, application security and terminal security.  
It is very hard to extract the exact figures for the whole system upgrade since 
applications and terminals have been used before the implementation of the PCI SS and 
were purchased from external vendors. Because of this, the applications and terminals 
upgrade expenditures are hard to provide, even more because vendors make 
investments and the applications and terminals upgrade has been made for more than 
one bank and concern the whole market. For the purpose of this case study, we will 
consider those expenditures insignificant because these expenditures have not shown 
any major influence on the market prices of the terminals and applications, probably 
because most of the vendors that have implemented these standards are large 
organizations who are selling worldwide. 
As far as data security is concerned, the experience enlightens us that this can be 
reached with major differences of components quality. Therefore, there can be major 
differences in the expenditures. Most of the components were also used on a processor 
level even before the implementation of the PCI SS. This represents another reason why 
the security upgrade expenditures are hard to extract. Consequently, we will use 
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information on the appraised expenditures for similar standards implementation, which is 
the ISO 20000 standard for IT service management and is related to organizational 
processes that affect security at the same time.  
The Bank has been working with two different processing centres until present with 
major differences in processing quantity. The experience of those processing centres 
shows that there are major differences in the appraised expenditures for the 
implementation of the ISO 20000 standard. The first one has evaluated the expenditures 
on €50.000 and the second one on €750.000. We also have to bear in mind that the 
number of member banks, connected to those two processing centres is different and 
that the first one does processing for not more than 5 banks, while the second one does 
processing for almost 20 banks. As a result, it is quite normal to have differences in the 
number of processes, especially control processes and to have differences in the overall 
expenditures. For the purpose of our research, we split the expenditures of the larger 
processing centre that provides services to 20 banks and use that expenditure on a bank 
level –€37.500 . 
 
The 3-D technology in the Bank has been implemented partially until this moment on 
acquiring level so exact figures for that part of the business can be used. Yet, the Bank 
is currently in the process of negotiation for the implementation of the technology on an 
issuing level and has also information of these expenditures. The experience of the 
implementation on acquiring level shows that the major expenditures are connected to a 
certification process for the technology in the payment card schemes, We refer also to 
MasterCard Worldwide and Visa Inc., and see that they go up to €30.000  for both 
payment card schemes. There were also expenditures on a processing level for 
configuration changes estimated up to €20.000 for both payment card schemes. The 
implementation proposals on the acquiring level show that the certification costs for the 
payment card schemes go up to €30.000 which can be extrapolated to the acquiring 
level. The expenditures on a processing level go up to €15.000 fixed and additional 
€2.000 per year or €14.000, if we assumed that the technology will be used for 7 years 
with today’s technological changes. 
The chip card technology in the Bank has been implemented fully on acquiring level one 
year ago and partially on issuing level, within one of the two payment card schemes. 
Nevertheless, we can use precise information of the expenditures since the Bank is 
currently in the process of certification of the rest of the issuing business. The records 
show that the process requires certification in the payment card schemes and costs 
around €30.000 for the issuing part and another €30.000 for the acquiring part for both 
payment card schemes. The shift towards chip card technology of the issuing part 
requires change in the personalization method that costs around €50.000. There are 
some additional costs for chip cards purchase, that would replace magnetic stripe cards, 
but these are quite low, compared to the rest of the costs and are very hard to predict 
since they refer to future card purchases after the implementation of the technology, 
besides the initial purchase.  The shift towards chip card technology of the acquiring part 
requires a change of the terminal software and testing that goes through several 
iterations till the required functionality of the software is reached and cost around 
€20.000. Both the issuing and the acquiring part require adaptation of the business 
processing that costs around €30.000 for each part. 
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An RMIS is used in the Bank since the beginning of the card business as a leased 
system from the bank-processing centre. There are monthly costs for its usage, paid to 
the processing centre. Conversely, here are options for purchase of such software and 
other system components from certified vendors that costs €100.000, depending on the 
quality of the used system components and we will employ that cost for the purpose of 
this research. The overall expenditures, as explained above, are summarized in table 3.  
 
Fraud measure type Expenditure type Amount 
PCI SS (ISO 20000) Approximate total implementation 37.500 € 
Subtotal PCI SS (ISO 20000) 37.500 € 
3-D technology Total certification 60.000 € 
3-D technology Processing adaptation 49.000 € 
Subtotal 3-D technology 109.000 €  
Chip card technology Total certification 60.000 € 
Chip card technology Processing adaptation 30.000 € 
Chip card technology Personalization method adaptation 50.000 € 
Chip card technology Terminal software changes 20.000 € 
Subtotal Chip (EMV) technology 160.000 €  
RMIS Software and system components 100.000 €  
Subtotal Risk Monitoring System 100.000 €  
Total Fraud measure implementation costs 406.500 € 
Table 3 – Fraud measure implementation expenditures 
The overall expenditures, divided into issuing and acquiring expenditures, are given in 
table 4. We have to consider that the total costs for PCI SS (ISO 20000) are doubled, as 
the processing adaptation costs for the chip card technology, since they would be 
applied regardless whether the measures would be implemented on one, or on both 
sides.  
 
Fraud measure type Issuing side costs Acquiring side costs 
PCI SS (ISO 20000) 37.500 € 37.500 € 
3-D technology 59.000 € 50.000 € 
Chip card technology 110.000 € 80.000 € 
Risk Monitoring System 100.000 € 100.000 € 
Total costs 306.500 € 267.500 € 
Table 4  – Fraud measure implementation expenditures on issuing and acquiring side 
The benefits from the different fraud measures can be looked upon from different angles.   
Firstly, we can look upon the total turnover protected by the fraud measures, which can 
go from €243 million on the issuing side to €271 million on the acquiring side in one 
year. 
Secondly, we have to consider the already recorded fraud as a portion of the turnover. 
On the issuing side, that fraud amounts up to €65.000 for the period of five years which 
is 0.005% of the total turnover if we consider only one fifth of the total five year issuing 
fraud (€13.000). On the acquiring side, that fraud amounts up to €302.000 for the same 
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period, which is 0.022% of the total turnover if we consider only one fifth of the total five 
year acquiring fraud (€60.400). 
In addition, we have to take into consideration that these percentages are very low, 
compared to industry averages that can go up to 5% fraud of the total turnover. If this 
was the case in the Bank, than the actual issuing fraud could go up to €12.150.000 per 
year or €60.750.000 for the period of five years and the acquiring fraud could go up to 
€13.550.000 per year or €67.750.000 for the same period. The figures of fraud as a 
percentage of the sales are shown in table 5.  
 
 Issuing side Acquiring 
side 
Total   
Yearly Sales €243.000.000 271.000.000 € 302.000.000 
€ 
Actual yearly fraud €13.000 €60.400 €73.400 
Industrial average yearly 
fraud  
€12.150.000 €13.550.000 €15.100.000 
Table 5  – Fraud as a percentage of the sales 
The “total fraud potential per year” is calculated without the “on-us” transactions that 
amount up to €212 million for the period of one year. If these were included, then the 
same transactions would have been calculated twice in the total amount. The “total 
actual fraud”, though, is calculated without such exclusion since the volume of “on-us” 
fraud is insignificant. The “total industry average based fraud” is calculated as a 
percentage (5%) of the “total fraud potential per year”. 
The net benefit from the implementation of the fraud combating systems and 
technologies can be expressed in more than one way, depending on the starting point 
on which fraud is based.  
Initially, if we compare the “total implementation costs” of €406.500 of table 3 with the 
“total fraud potential” in terms of turnover €302 million (table 5) we will find out that the 
cost/benefit ratio is 0.13%. 
However, the real cost/benefit ratio is the ratio that would include the “actual costs” 
(€406.500) and the “actual fraud experienced” (€73.400) and results in 5.5381 or 
553,81% per year which means that ROI will be experienced in a little more than 5 years 
time. This result is on the limit of acceptability, since we can assume that the used 
technology fraud protection technology would probably change within 5-7 years. 
However, this does not have to be the case since the predecessors of today’s chip card 
and 3-D technologies, have been used for far more than 5-7 years.  
We also have to remember the fact that the actual experienced fraud in the Bank is quite 
low and below industry averages, as we have mentioned before. If we compare the 
“actual costs” (€406.500) with the 5% fraud industry average (€15.100.000), we find out 
that the cost benefit ratio results in 2.69% and that ROI will be reached in the third year 
of usage of the protective measures, which is more financially acceptable.  
As far as the acquiring cost/benefit ratio is concerned, the results are following. The 
comparison of the acquiring side costs (€267.500) and the acquiring fraud potential per 
year in terms of turnover (€271.000.000), gives a cost/benefit ratio of 0.0987%. The 
comparison of the acquiring side costs (€267.500) and the actual acquiring fraud per 
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year (€60.400) gives a cost/benefit ratio of 442.88%, which means that the investment 
would be returned in 4 years. However, the comparison between the acquiring side 
costs (€267.500) and the industry based average acquiring fraud (€13.550.000) gives a 
cost/benefit ratio of 1,97%, which means that the investment would be returned within 
the first year. These findings are summarized in the table 6.  
 
Cost/Benefit Ratio Type C/B 
Value 
ROI 
Total costs/total fraud potential (year) 0, 0013 Year 1 
Total costs/total actual fraud (year) 5, 5381 Year 5 
Total costs/total actual fraud (ind. avg.) (year) 0, 0269 Year 1 
Issuing costs/issuing fraud potential (year) 0, 0012 Year 1 
Issuing costs/actual issuing fraud (year) 23, 5769 Year 23 
Issuing costs/actual issuing fraud (ind. avg.) (year) 0, 0252 Year 1 
Acquiring costs/acquiring fraud potential (year) 0, 0009 Year 1 
Acquiring costs/actual acquiring fraud (year) 4, 4288 Year 4 
Acquiring costs/actual acquiring fraud (ind. avg.) 
(year) 
0, 0197 Year 1 
Table 6  – ROI on fraud measures 
We also have to take into consideration that most of the expenditures are fixed and that 
the Bank is a medium sized bank according to the number of cards in circulation, and 
according to the turnover. Since the number of cards and turnover vary between banks, 
depending on their size, and most of the costs are fixed (around 60% assumed), there is 
a bank size under which there is no economic value from the implementation of these 
fraud protecting measures.  
If we assume that the total implementation costs would not go under those 60% and take 
that amount as the “minimal amount of costs for the implementation” (€243.900), and if 
we presume that the technologies and systems would have a lifetime of 7 years, we 
would come to a “total industry average based actual fraud” of €34.842 per year that 
would make the investment worthwhile. If we deduce that the same “total industry 
average based actual fraud/actual turnover ratio” would apply, we see that a bank has to 
have a total turnover per year of €696.857 to make the investment into fraud protecting 
measures meaningful. Off course, there are always opportunities to implement some of 
the measures, which is considerable for banks that do not expect a high turnover volume 
from their card business.  
The Bank has implemented all of the mentioned fraud reduction systems and 
technologies. The effects from some of them can be measured and others can not. For 
example, the effects from the implementation of the PCI SS cannot be measured 
directly, as there were no successful hacking attacks made on the bank in the past, for 
the today’s effects to be measured with. The standards are protecting the core of the 
business and it would be all or nothing left from the business in case of an attack, 
depending on whether the standards would serve their purpose and stop the attack or 
not. 
The 3-D technology has also been implemented partially till now, only on the acquiring 
side. The effects will be seen in a couple of years when the fraud volumes will be 
measured against the industry averages and when the technology will be implemented 
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also on the issuing side. However, the Bank does not expect any major losses in the 
future since the technology offers protection of the issuing and acquiring side from direct 
dispute losses, even if fraud occurs.  
Chip card technology has been implemented recently as well, first on the Bank ATMs 
and now it is in the process of full implementation on the POS terminals on the acquiring 
side. As far as the issuing side is concerned, the technology was implemented on the 
Visa brand from the beginning, and currently, it is in the process of implementation on 
the MasterCard brand.  
Results show significant fraud reduction on the acquiring side (ATMs and POS 
terminals) with no more than 10 fraudulent transactions in the last 6 months on the 
bank’s ATMs. POS terminals show differences between the two brands. While the chip 
card technology was implemented from the beginning on the Visa brand and is in the 
process of implementation for the MasterCard brand, it shows major differences in fraud 
volumes. Actually, there have not been any major fraudulent purchases on the Visa 
brand on the POS terminals from the beginning, while the MasterCard brand suffers 
from multiple monthly attacks.  
On the issuing side, the Visa brand has had only two fraudulent cases from the 
beginning, which represents a period of approximately 3 years. The MasterCard brand, 
on the other hand, has suffered multiple attacks in the same period.  
The bank uses a RMIS from the beginning. The effects have not been measured 
directly, in terms of a number of identified and stopped fraudulent volumes, but fraud 
attempts have been stopped on the acquiring side, some originating from unknown 
fraudsters and some from the merchants themselves. On the issuing side, clients have 
expressed satisfaction from the timely stoppage of card thefts and skimming attempts so 
far. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This research presents the fraud problem and the fraud reduction efforts of the PCI seen 
from multiple aspects, both qualitative and quantitative ones. We present the PCI 
functions, as an IS that receives input about payment data, transfers the data to 
complete the payment, and store them on multiple locations and media. We showed that 
the system can be subject to data theft. By identifying the most important points for data 
input, transfer and storage, we extracted the weak points of the system as a basis of 
fraud appearance – data theft.  
We showed that the data theft can take up many forms, depending on the source of the 
theft and classified the different forms of data theft into different fraudulent appearances. 
We showed the magnitude of the losses in one of the most developed card economy – 
U.K., to show how big the fraud problem could be.  
The final findings show that the benefits from implementing the fraud reduction efforts 
are multiple. The organizations that implement them, the banks, are motivated to offer 
such technologies and information systems to the final customers since the costs for 
their implementation are bearable costs for the business. The bank has to be very small, 
from the payment card services point of view, to experience losses from the fixed 
expenditures coming with the implementation of the fraud reduction information systems 
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and technologies. A medium sized and a large bank should not even see any problems 
arising from the expenditures associated with the fraud reduction information systems 
and technologies. The final customers see benefits from the usage of the fraud reduction 
efforts of the banks, associated with the automation of the fraud protection. The 
information systems and technologies presented in this work offer an automated 
response towards fraud protection easing the fraud protection process. The PCI SS offer 
protection of the whole payment information system, requiring minimal human effort after 
the implementation. The 3-D and chip technology offer automated fraud protection for 
the cardholders in the non-face-to-face, as well as face-to-face payment process, not 
requiring any effort by the cardholder himself. The 3-D technology offers additional 
protection of the Internet payment process with the usage of passwords that can be 
different every time the cardholder makes a purchase online. The chip technology 
makes every communication of the card with the network different. This reduces the 
requirement for a self-protection instinct of the cardholder, bringing the payment process 
where it once was, in the zone where cards were seen as an easy way for payment, not 
as an easy way for losing money. The banks’ risk monitoring systems additionally 
contribute to the fraud reduction and cardholder protection, serving as a backup option, 
a secondary control of the system. This brings the banks to a new level, as payment 
card service providers directly associated with the final customers. Besides the role of 
service providers, they take up role as service protectors, adding to their reputation.  
Based on the presented facts we can conclude that, in overall, the fraud reduction 
information systems and technologies do have a positive effect on all sides included in 
the payment process, fulfilling the expectations of all of them. Therefore, this work adds 
to the initiative for implementation of such systems and technologies and most certainly, 
adds to the efforts for innovation of new ones in the future.  
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